04_Romanov_391_co_415 30/10/15 13:10 Pagina 400 400 ANDREY ROMANOV 400 Indeed, when Wisdom is mentioned in regard to creation the cor- responding texts use either the preposition evn (like Ps 104,24; cf. Jer 28,15 LXX) or the so-called Dativus Instrumenti (as in Prov 3,19; Wis 9,2). In both cases Wisdom is depicted as God’s instrument. In contrast, what is said in 1 Cor 8,6b about Jesus Christ points to his specific and individual function in creation as the only one “through whom”; as far as I know this has no parallel in Jewish Wisdom literature. Also the parallel with Philo’s Logos proposed by Horsley seems questionable. First of all, the prepositional phrase used in Cher. 125 is identical only with 1 Cor 8,6b (that is, with what is said about Jesus Christ). The prepositions used for God are different in the two texts. While Philo uses u`po,, Paul uses evk; in fact, evk in Middle Platonism was traditionally used to designate the material cause (that is, the matter, the object of God’s creative activity) which is also clear from Cher. 125 itself 30. That Paul’s use of evk with respect to God in 1 Cor 8,6 is not accidental is evident, for the same prepo- sition is also found in Rom 11,36. If Paul has in mind (as Horsley suggests) the prepositional distinction between God and the Lord as they are presented in Philo’s distinction between God and the Logos, why does he ascribe to God the preposition which is used in Philo for a different cause? And as far as there is a difference between Philo and Paul in the use of prepositions with respect to God, how can one be sure that the same prepositions with respect to the Logos and to Jesus Christ have the same meaning? Moreover, I assume that Philo’s stress in Cher. 125-127 on the particular meaning of dia, as a direct indication of the form of instrumentality was rather contextual and served his particular goals in his particular argument. He does not hesitate, for instance, in Leg. 1.41 to use dia, to describe God’s action (along with u`po,). Does it mean that Philo is not con- sistent in his use of the prepositions? Or, possibly, when he attributes dia, to the Logos does he realize that he in fact attributes it to God himself? This latter question points to the other significant problem for both Horsley’s assumption and the Wisdom-Christology hypothesis, namely, how should the very nature of Logos/Wisdom be under- stood. If Philo was dependent on (Middle) Platonism, he was aware of the fact that the instrumental cause was often used there to de- lineate merely an idea or logos/word of God (like his phantasia), 30 See the text in n. 7 above.