Adina Moshavi, «Two Types of Argumentation Involving Rhetorical Questions in Biblical Hebrew Dialogue», Vol. 90 (2009) 32-46
Rhetorical questions (henceforth RQs) often express a premise in a logical argument. Although the use of RQs in arguments has been widely noted, the modes of reasoning underlying the arguments have not received sufficient attention. The present study investigates argumentative RQs in the prose dialogue in Genesis through Kings in the light of pragmatic argumentation theory. Two logical forms, modus tollens and denying the antecedent, are identified as accounting for the majority of arguments expressed by RQs. The first type is generally intended to deductively establish its conclusion, while the second, formally invalid form is used presumptively to challenge the addressee to justify his position. There is also a presumptive variety of the modus tollens argument, which is based on a subjective premise. Both modus tollens and denying the antecedent have similar linguistic representations and can be effective means of refusing directives.
44 Adina Moshavi
to the charge that they have unfairly monopolized the king (2 Sam 19,43). A
pair of RQs representing the premise “Not (B or C)†are preceded by a
“why†RQ implying the conclusion “Not Aâ€:
“Why are you angry over this matter? Have we consumed anything
that belongs to the king? Has he given us any gifts?â€
If this were modus tollens, the argument would be “If you are angry
with us, then it must be that we have consumed something that belongs to
the king or that we have received gifts from the king. Since neither of these
is the case, you should not be angry with us.†But clearly the speakers do
not mean to assert that these are the only possible reasons for the Israelites
to be angry with them regarding the king. These are merely examples of
situations that the speakers admit would constitute legitimate grievances if
they had occurred. In other words, in the modus tollens reconstruction the
first premise in the argument is false, rendering the argument incorrect even
from the perspective of the speaker. The denying-the-antecedent form yields
a better result:
“If we had consumed something that belongs to the king or we had
received gifts from the king, then you would be justified in being
angry with us. Neither of these situations is the case (nor, we believe,
are any other situations that would justify your anger.) Therefore,
you should not be angry with us.â€
In nearly all examples of denying the antecedent the premise is
expressed by a yes-no question, e.g., (51)
“Now he is dead; why should I fast? Can I bring him back again?†(2
Sam 12,23)
“Are the palms of Zebah and Zalmunna already in your hands, that
we should give bread to your troops?†(Judg 8,6)
In a few instances the premise is expressed by a content RQ, e.g.,
How many years are left to me, that I should go up with the king to
Jerusalem? (2 Sam 19,35)
What do you lack with me, that you seek to go to your own country?
(1 Kgs 11,22)
6. Presumptive modus tollens
As described above, deductive modus tollens and presumptive denying
of the antecedent are neatly distinguished both in logical nature and in
argumentative purpose. Examination of the Biblical corpus, however, shows
that modus tollens has a presumptive use that closely mirrors denying the
antecedent. In order to illustrate this point, I examine a discourse function
typical of argumentative RQs: refusal of a directive previously issued by the
addressee.
Directives can be taken to imply a modal proposition A of the form,
(51) See also, e.g., Gen 31,14; Exod 14,11; Num 11,12.22; 22,37, Judg 8,15; 14,3, 1
Sam 17,43; 2 Sam 3,8; 12,23; 19,36.