The Divine Violence in the Book of Qoheleth 557 have a shared interest in knowledge and in the problem of evil. For Qoheleth, however, the Enochic solution is impracticable. The criticism which he brings to bear against the Enochic beliefs borders on irony. No eschatological salvation is conceivable; no heavenly revelation can be invoked; no form of life after death can be imagined (cf., especially, Qoh 3,18-21) (45). For Qoheleth, in particular, as a solution to the problem of evil and violence one cannot invoke the presence of a just God who will judge violence itself and eliminate it in the times to come with a radical solution. For Qoheleth, the future simply cannot be known (cf., for example, Qoh 8,7; 10,14) and the action of God cannot be criticized by man. For Qoheleth, as we said before, oppression and violence cannot be explained in the light of a reassuring theology of the Covenant, nor is it possible to turn the accusation round and set it against man’s lack of faith. Even the Enochic route of searching for a metahistorical cause for violence and for an eschatological solution entrusted to the intervention of God seems to Qoheleth to be entirely precluded. 6. Divine Violence and Human Incomprehension It may seem that at this point there remains for Qoheleth only one option: that of considering God as being finally responsible for the injustice present in the world, in a word, of considering him to be a violent God. In fact, Qoheleth does not go down this road; he even rejects the protests of Job. For Qoheleth, God is simply beyond all human judgement (cf. Qoh 8,16-17). We should observe, however, that in this attitude, Qoheleth shows himself neither an atheist nor a sceptic, not even an agnostic, but rather as profoundly faithful. From this point of view, one can consider Qoheleth as the anti-Adam, or as the antithesis of the μda of Gen 2-3. Qoheleth is the wise man who refuses to gather the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil and who knows instead how to accept life, as God offers it to humanity, with the good and the evil (cf., for example, Qoh 7,13-14) (46). (45) Cf. also G. BOCCACCINI, I giudaismi del Secondo Tempio. Da Ezechiele a Daniele (Brescia 2008) 146-148. (46) “The relation of man to the knowledge of wisdom goes beyond ethical categories and is a problem of the very nature of things. The first Adam placed his trust in knowledge. Qoheleth’s Adam has recognised the mistake of the first