Walter T. Wilson, «Matthew, Philo, and Mercy for Animals (Matt 12,9-14)», Vol. 96 (2015) 201-221
After comparing Matt 12,11-12 with its synoptic parallels (Mark 3,4; Luke 13,15-16; 14,5) and with texts that discuss the treatment of animals on the Sabbath (e.g., CD 11.13-14), the passage is compared with Philonic texts (Spec. 2.89; 4.218; Virt. 81, 133, 139-140, 160; cf. Plutarch, Cato 5.5; Esu carn. 996A; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 30.186; Porphyry, Abst. 3.26.6) in which the Alexandrian discerns a principle informing a law that refers to the treatment of animals, and then suggests that the principle applies by analogy to the treatment of people, illuminating the principle with reference to mercy and similar concepts.
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basic argument) would not have been inconsistent with efforts to
make Jesus’ moral teachings intelligible to non-Jewish audiences
as well. As Ulrich Luz has suggested, although Matthew’s Gospel
most likely originated in a Jewish Christian milieu, among the
evangelist’s emerging priorities is the mission to the Gentiles, a task
that would have entailed the “adaptation” of the community’s legal
traditions to an expanding and increasingly pluralistic audience 62.
In this regard, it is significant that in Matt 12,11 the merciful treat-
ment of an animal is presented not as a dictate of the Mosaic law
(as was the case in the examples from Philo discussed above) but
as a self-evident matter of common experience and practice.
Such considerations provide a vantage point from which to re-
flect on the importance attached to the teaching/learning process in
Matthew’s interpretation of the Law, an emphasis shared by Philo.
As we have seen, in the Exposition, the Alexandrian repeatedly
draws attention to how through the Law Moses educates its adher-
ents in virtue, honing their moral dispositions in particular ways.
The appeal to “learn from me” in Matt 11,29, meanwhile, reflects
a narrative priority for the First Gospel as a whole, namely, the por-
trayal of Jesus as one who teaches and his followers as ones who
learn 63. In concert with this, it is apparent that for both authors what
is at stake for their readers is learning not simply the correct obser-
vance of particular laws, but also how to reason about the relevance
of the Law in determining human responsibilities more broadly. In
the case of Matthew, the principles supporting this form of reason-
ing are summed up under the related concepts of mercy (12,7) and
“doing good” (12,12) 64, principles exemplified by who Jesus is
(11,29), what Jesus says (12,7.12) and what Jesus does (12,13). The
need for such reasoning abilities is essential, since, as R. T. France
observes, the conclusion in Matt 12,12b (lacking the second set of
alternatives in Mark 3,4) not only “goes far beyond the specific
62
LUZ, Matthew, I, 50-52. Cf. P. FOSTER, Community, Law and Mission
in Matthew’s Gospel (WUNT 2/177; Tübingen 2004) 253-260.
63
U. LUZ, Studies in Matthew (Grand Rapids, MI 2005) 115-142. The
term dida,skaloj informs Jesus’ self-presentation in 10,24-25 and 23,8. Note
also the use of dida,skein in 4,23; 5,2; 7,29; 9,35; 11,1; 13,54; 21,23; 22,16;
26,55; 28,20 (cf. 7,28; 22,33).
64
For the connection between mercy and “doing good”, see Mic 6,8; Sir
2,9; Acts 9,36; cf. T. Zeb. 7.2.