Walter T. Wilson, «Matthew, Philo, and Mercy for Animals (Matt 12,9-14)», Vol. 96 (2015) 201-221
After comparing Matt 12,11-12 with its synoptic parallels (Mark 3,4; Luke 13,15-16; 14,5) and with texts that discuss the treatment of animals on the Sabbath (e.g., CD 11.13-14), the passage is compared with Philonic texts (Spec. 2.89; 4.218; Virt. 81, 133, 139-140, 160; cf. Plutarch, Cato 5.5; Esu carn. 996A; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 30.186; Porphyry, Abst. 3.26.6) in which the Alexandrian discerns a principle informing a law that refers to the treatment of animals, and then suggests that the principle applies by analogy to the treatment of people, illuminating the principle with reference to mercy and similar concepts.
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208 WALTER T. WILSON 208
Law educates its adherents in virtue 31. In the case of De humanitate,
Philo endeavors to show how the virtue of humanity (filanqrwpi,a)
was so important to Moses that in his legislation its application ex-
tends to the treatment not only of various categories of people (the
poor, slaves, enemies, non-Jews) but even to the categories of ani-
mals and plants.
He establishes fairness and gentleness not only among the associa-
tions that people have with one another, but with great lavishness
he also pours them out richly and extends them even to animals who
are by nature irrational and to the different species of cultivated
trees. (Hum. 81)
Indeed, in the section of the sub-treatise devoted to a review of
specific statutes (§§ 80-160), Philo dedicates nearly as much space
to laws concerning animals and plants (§§ 125-60) as he does to
laws that explicitly mention the treatment of human beings (§§ 82-
124) 32. This decision on his part indicates something both about
the importance of such laws in making his case as well as some-
thing about how he thinks such laws ought to be interpreted. Specif-
ically, as Katell Berthelot has shown, the form of reasoning that
guides the Alexandrian in his interpretation of these laws combines
analogical arguments with arguments a minori ad maius 33. In each
case, he discerns an underlying principle informing a law that refers
to the treatment of animals, and then suggests that the principle ap-
plies by analogy even more so to the treatment of people. As we
shall see, the moral implications of the principle at hand are often
illuminated with recourse to one or more concepts related both to
filanqrwpi,a and to one another, especially fairness (evpiei,keia),
gentleness (h`mero,thj), kindness (crhsto,thj), and mercy (e;leoj) 34.
31
See especially Spec. 4.133-135, a transitional statement that identifies
a whole “choir” of virtues, namely, wisdom, justice, piety, and moderation,
to which he later adds courage (Virt. 1) and humanity (Virt. 51). Cf. Spec.
2.62-63, 167.
32
The central section of the sub-treatise is organized according to three
broad categories of moral referents: people (§§ 82-124), animals (§§ 125-
147), and plants (§§ 148-160), presented in the reverse order of creation.
33
K. BERTHELOT, Philanthrôpia Judaica: Le débat autour de la “misan-
thropie” des lois juives dans l’Antiquité (JSJSup 76; Leiden 2003) 288-293.
34
Hum. 125, 127, 134, 140, 141, 144, 146, 148, 160.