03_Wilson_201_221_201_221 10/07/15 12:41 Pagina 210 210 WALTER T. WILSON 210 imals exist for the sake of human beings, and their primary purpose is to serve them 39. That Philo was familiar with the particulars of this debate, and that he sided with the Stoics in such particulars, is evident from his treatise, De animalibus, in which he concludes: “To elevate animals to the level of the human race and to grant equality to unequals is the height of injustice. To ascribe serious self-restraint to indifferent and almost invisible creatures is to insult those whom nature has endowed with the best part” (Anim. 100) 40. Returning to De humanitate, in light of such comments what makes the inclusion of animals (not to mention plants) remarkable in Philo’s survey of laws is not their presumed similarity with human beings but rather their presumed dissimilarity. In his opinion, Moses’ commitment to the virtue of humanity was so prolific and his concern to universalize its practice so profound, that his laws extended its application even to “indifferent and almost invisible creatures”, the assumption being that the legislation concerning animals serves as a form of training through which the practitioners of the law become even more humane in their treatment of other people. For evidence of this, we can start with Philo’s commentary on Exod 23,5, the injunction to help lift up an enemy’s draft animal that has fallen under its burden (cf. Deut 22,4). According to his interpretation, obedience to this statute promotes gentleness (h`mero,thj) insofar as it teaches by extension (po,rrwqen) that one should succumb to neither Schadenfreude nor envy in dealing with other people (Hum. 116). His reasoning as to the injunction’s ped- agogical effect on its adherents implies a certain analogy between the two forms of moral action, even as it also presupposes a certain hierarchy in the referents of such action: “Who would disregard any human being, with whom he has a single natural kinship, when he has been taught by the divine law and is accustomed not to disregard even a beast?” (QE 2.12). Similarly, according to Spec. 4.203, the law prohibiting owners from mating their cattle with an- 39 E.g., CICERO, Fin. 3.67; EPICTETUS, Diatr. 1.6.12-22; 1.16.1-21; SVF II, 1152-1167; cf. U. DIERAUER, Tier und Mensch im Denken der Antike. Studien zur Tierpsychologie, Anthropologie und Ethik (Amsterdam 1977) 224-245. 40 Translation from A. TERIAN, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus. The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary (Chico, CA 1981) 108. For the Stoic concept of teleological anthropocentrism, see PHILO, Mos. 1.60-62; 2.22; Spec. 2.69; 4.119-121.