Walter T. Wilson, «Matthew, Philo, and Mercy for Animals (Matt 12,9-14)», Vol. 96 (2015) 201-221
After comparing Matt 12,11-12 with its synoptic parallels (Mark 3,4; Luke 13,15-16; 14,5) and with texts that discuss the treatment of animals on the Sabbath (e.g., CD 11.13-14), the passage is compared with Philonic texts (Spec. 2.89; 4.218; Virt. 81, 133, 139-140, 160; cf. Plutarch, Cato 5.5; Esu carn. 996A; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 30.186; Porphyry, Abst. 3.26.6) in which the Alexandrian discerns a principle informing a law that refers to the treatment of animals, and then suggests that the principle applies by analogy to the treatment of people, illuminating the principle with reference to mercy and similar concepts.
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214 WALTER T. WILSON 214
manity that contributes to the moral formation of its practitioners:
“Who could wrong a human being when he found himself so gently
and humanely disposed towards other non-human creatures?” (Esu
carn. 996A) 47. In the sentence preceding this question, he describes
the development of such a disposition as a means of evqismo,j
(“habitutation”) in the virtue of humanity. Opinions of this sort
were sometimes voiced in conjunction with arguments against an-
imal sacrifice and the consumption of animal flesh, arguments that
were associated especially with the legacy of Pythagoras 48. Ac-
cording to Iamblichus, for example, he
ordered abstinence from living beings for many reasons, but mainly
because the practice tended to promote peace. For once human be-
ings become accustomed (evqizo,menoi) to loathe the slaughter of an-
imals as lawless and contrary to nature, they would no longer make
war, thinking it even more (polu.. ma/llon) unlawful to kill a human
being 49. (Vit. Pythag. 30.186)
The author’s working assumption is that habituation to the hu-
mane treatment of animals shapes more humane patterns of conduct
towards other people. A similar sort of argument a minori ad maius
is employed by Porphyry in Abst. 3.26.6: “One who abstains from
all animate creatures, even those that do not make a social contract
with him, will abstain all the more (pollw/| ma/llon) from harm to
his own kind” 50. He goes on to interpret comportment guided by
these principles as a means of safeguarding the practice of justice,
a virtue that Philo closely aligned with humanity (e.g., Philo, Mos. 2.9;
Decal. 164; Spec. 2.63). Such comparisons, then, indicate that in
47
Cf. Inim. util. 91C; Sollert. 959E-960A; É. DE FONTENAY, “La philan-
thrôpia à l’épreuve des bêtes”, L’animal dans l’antiquité (eds. B. CASSIN –
J.-L. LABARRIÈRE) (Paris 1997) 281-298.
48
DIERAUER, Tier und Mensch, 285-293; SORABJI, Animal Minds, 170-194.
49
Translation from J. DILLON – J. HERSHBELL, Iamblichus. On the
Pythagorean Way of Life (SBLTT 29; Atlanta, GA 1991) 195. Cf. BERTHELOT,
Philanthrôpia, 294-297.
50
Translation from G. CLARK, Porphyry. On Abstinence from Killing An-
imals (London 2000) 97. Porphyry may be drawing on the theories of
Theophrastus, who is mentioned by name in Abst. 3.25.1 as well as in 2.32.3,
shortly after a passage that parallels 3.26.6 (i.e., 2.31.3). See J. BOUFFARTIGUES
– M. PATILLON, Porphyre. De l’abstinence (Paris 1979) II, 25-26, 29.