Walter T. Wilson, «Matthew, Philo, and Mercy for Animals (Matt 12,9-14)», Vol. 96 (2015) 201-221
After comparing Matt 12,11-12 with its synoptic parallels (Mark 3,4; Luke 13,15-16; 14,5) and with texts that discuss the treatment of animals on the Sabbath (e.g., CD 11.13-14), the passage is compared with Philonic texts (Spec. 2.89; 4.218; Virt. 81, 133, 139-140, 160; cf. Plutarch, Cato 5.5; Esu carn. 996A; Iamblichus, Vit. Pythag. 30.186; Porphyry, Abst. 3.26.6) in which the Alexandrian discerns a principle informing a law that refers to the treatment of animals, and then suggests that the principle applies by analogy to the treatment of people, illuminating the principle with reference to mercy and similar concepts.
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213 MATTHEW, PHILO, AND MERCY FOR ANIMALS (MATT 12,9-14) 213
Konstan observes, with this statement Philo is assigning mercy “a
place of privilege in relation to reason”, thereby elevating its status
in his scheme of moral values 45. His motivation for doing so at this
particular juncture in the Exposition may reflect the influence of
Jewish traditions, as evidenced by T. Zeb. 5.1 (“show mercy to your
neighbor and have compassion towards all, not only towards people
but also irrational animals”) as well as an array of other texts that
enjoin the humane treatment of animals 46. In any case, Spec. 2.96
and Hum. 141 and 144 make it plain that animals as well as people
are to be included among the recipients of e;leoj, which should be
extended (according to passages elsewhere in the Exposition) espe-
cially to the needy (e.g., Spec. 1.308; 2.115) and to those who have
experienced misfortune (e.g., Decal. 69; Spec. 2.138; 4.76).
As noted previously, in developing these sorts of positions, it is
apparent that Philo was not operating in an intellectual vacuum. On
the contrary, it appears that he was deliberately participating in a
broader conversation taking place among ancient moralists about
the relationship between people and animals. That he would enter
into such a conversation within the context of a discussion about
filanqrwpi,a is worthy of attention, particularly when we take
into account a text such as the following.
For the sake of humanity (filanqrw,,pou) we should accustom
(proeqiste,on) ourselves to mildness and kindness in our dealings
with other creatures. I certainly would not sell an ox that had worked
for me, just because it was old, much less an elderly man. (Plutarch,
Cato 5.5)
Like Philo, Plutarch draws a hierarchically organized analogy
between the treatment of animals and the treatment of people. Also
like Philo, he sees kindness to animals as a type of training in hu-
45
D. KONSTAN, “Philo’s De virtutibus in the Perspective of Classical
Greek Philosophy”, SPhA 18 (2006) 67.
46
E.g., Prov 12,10; Sir 18,13; 2 En. 58.1-59.5; Ps.-Phoc. 84-85, 139-140,
188; PHILO, Hypoth. 7.7, 9; JOSEPHUS, C. Ap. 2.213-214; b. Shab. 128b. For
the rabbinic concept of tza‘ar ba‘alei hayyim, see E.J. SCHOCHET, Animal Life
in Jewish Traditions (New York 1984) 151-155. Concerning Lev 22,28
(which forbids the slaughter of an animal and its young together), the Targum
Pseudo-Jonathan writes: “Just as I in heaven am merciful, so shall you be
merciful on earth”.