03_Wilson_201_221_201_221 10/07/15 12:41 Pagina 212 212 WALTER T. WILSON 212 it is altogether inappropriate to burden and oppress other people. For if the different parts of the earth, which by nature share in neither pleasure nor pain, ought to be given a share of rest, how much more (pw/j ouvci. ma/llon) must this be the case with people, who possess not only the sense that is common to the irrational animals but also the special gift of reason? (Spec. 2.89) Accordingly, the law teaches masters to refrain from imposing severe orders on their slaves (Spec. 2.90-91), and rulers to refrain from imposing heavy taxes on their subjects (Spec. 2.92-95). Those who fail in this regard, he says, have failed to learn the importance of showing mercy (e;leoj) to those most in need of it (Spec. 2.96). The theme of mercy also plays a role in Hum. 137-141, a passage in which Philo explains why Moses prohibited his followers from sacrificing pregnant animals. Although he refers to it as a no,moj, the prohibition as such is not found in scripture, but rather is something that Philo infers from Lev 22,28 (discussed in §§ 134-136), perhaps under the influence of oral tradition (cf. 4QMMT B 36; 4Q270 9 ii 14-15; 11QT LII 5; m. Hul. 4.5). At any rate, it was from this prece- dent, he says, that the lawgivers of other nations derived the rule that a pregnant woman condemned to death must not be executed until she has delivered her child (§ 139). In Philo’s opinion, this claim serves as proof that Moses “extends the duty of fair treatment to irra- tional animals, so that by practicing (avskh,santej) on species of dif- ferent kinds we might exercise humanity even more so (pollh/| tini periousi,a)| among beings of like kind to ourselves” (§ 140) 43. Con- trary to his detractors, then, the legislation of Moses does not promote inhumane and antisocial practices, but rather “these laws obviously grant a share of mercy (evle,ou) even to herds of cattle, and the people through the guidance of customs learned from their earliest youth amend any disobedience in their souls to a civilized disposition” (§ 141). Shortly thereafter (in a discussion of Exod 23,19; 34,26; Deut 14,21), he goes on to identify e;leoj as the “passion that is most indispensable and most closely related to the rational soul” (§ 144) 44. As David 43 The acquisition of virtue depends on three elements (nature, instruction, and practice), the last of which is explicitly addressed here. Cf. Abr. 52-54; Ios. 1; Mos. 1.76; Spec. 4.24; Hum. 133; Praem. 65. 44 The classification of mercy as one of the passions reflects Stoic influ- ence, e.g., DIOGENES LAERTIUS, Vit. phil. 7.111; cf. SVF III, 394, 413-414, 416; CICERO, Tusc. 4.18; PLUTARCH, Stoic. rep. 1046B-C.