Luca Mazzinghi, «The Divine Violence in the Book of Qoheleth», Vol. 90 (2009) 545-558
In the face of violence, Qoheleth’s answer: “There is no one to console them” (Qoh 4,1) seems to be a hostile allusion aimed at God (cf. Isa 40,1) who is considered responsible for that violence. Yet Qoheleth’s God is not an abstract and remote deity; Qoheleth’s criticism is directed rather at the God of retribution (cf. Qoh 9,1-3). By stressing divine transcendence, Qoheleth considers that God is beyond all human comprehension (cf. 8,16-17). In Qoheleth one cannot speak of divine violence, but there is the problem of human language about God. Man can only “fear God” and accept the joy that God grants him as a gift in his fleeting life.
552 Luca Mazzinghi
challenged, how is that God really different from the tyrants of the
earth? Is he responsible for all the violence which is in the world (30)?
4. Criticism of God or of the God of Tradition?
In texts such as Qoh 8,11-14 and 9,1-3 Qoheleth, as Crenshaw
remarks, “quotes traditional belief and then exposes it in the harsh light
of experience. In this case, however, he comes perilously close to
blaming God for the spread of wickedness (...). Qoheleth considers the
resulting situation totally absurd†(31). And yet, in contrast with
Schoors, Crenshaw recognizes that, while Qoheleth “offers no defence
of divine justiceâ€, at the same time he provides an indirect theodicy:
“the problem is no longer God; it has now become the limits of rational
discourse about deity. Theodicy, then, is insoluble, a mystery that is
embedded in the unfathomable mystery of God†(32).
The observations of Crenshaw in particular allow us to go further
into two important aspects to which he does not give sufficient weight.
In the first place, Qoheleth appears, throughout along his book, to
be a critic of the traditional doctrine of Israel. In Qoh 8,11-14, for
example, Qoheleth argues against the traditional idea of retribution (or
better, the so-called Tun-Ergehen-Zusammenhang). Qoh 8,11-14 is a
difficult and disputed text, but it is sufficiently clear that the idea of
“fearing God†bound up with rewards and punishments is radically
contested here by Qoheleth (33). When, therefore, Qoheleth writes that
“sentence against an evil deed is not executed speedily†(8,11), he is
not indirectly accusing God of being responsible for the violence and
injustice in the world. Rather he is challenging the existence of the
retributive principle such as it was conceived in Israelite tradition. For
him, “fearing God†is something that must be separated from any
notion of reward or punishment, something, thus, totally free.
(30) “This mystery of the remote and hidden God, the deus otiosus, including
both divine nature and activity, led to Qoheleth’s loss of confidence in beneficent
Providence...â€; L.G. PERDUE, The Sword and the Stylus. An Introduction to
Wisdom in the Age of Empires (Grand Rapids, MI – Cambridge 2008) 253.
(31) J.L. CRENSHAW, Defending God. Biblical Responses to the Problem of
Evil (New York 2005) 168.
(32) CRENSHAW, Defending God, 169.
(33) For this topic, cf., now, L. MAZZINGHI, “Esegesi ed ermeneutica di un libro
difficile: l’esempio di Qo 8,11-14â€, Biblical Exegesis in Progress. Old and New
Testament Essays (eds. J.N. ALETTI – J.L. SKA) (AnBib 176; Rome 2009) 173-
207.